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COMMENTS
General and Special Laws in Louisiana
The need for restrictions on the use of legislative influence
to obtain special privileges for private interest groups and in-
dividuals and the necessity for uniform instead of variegated
local legislation have led many states to enact statutory and
constitutional provisions prohibiting special or local legislation
under certain circumstances.' While the New England states
have imposed no restrictions whatsoever,2 twenty-eight states3
1. 2 PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 391, comment
(1954).
2. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Is-
land, Vermont, and Ohio.
3. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming; for
reference to the particular constitutional provision in each state, see 2 SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2101, n. 3 (3d ed. 1943).
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prohibit special legislation where a general law is applicable,
and five states4 prohibit special or local laws where there is a
general law on the subject. Many states have prohibited special
laws under any circumstances in certain enumerated fields ;5 a
few of these states, however, provide certain requirements for
notice by publication in those instances where a special law is
not specifically prohibited.6 Louisiana's prohibitory provisions
fall into the two latter categories.
Article IV, section 4, of the Louisiana Constitution specif-
ically enumerates twenty-one fields wherein special or local laws
are prohibited,7 and article IV, section 6, provides that notice
4. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4(1); GA. CONST. art. I, § 4(1); Ky. CONST. §60;
MD. CONST. art. III, § 33; PA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
5. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104; ARiz. CONST. art. IV, § 19; ARK. CONST. art. V,
§§ 24, 25; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25; FLA. CONST.
art. III, § 20; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22; IND.
CONST. art. IV, § 22; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 30; KY. CONST. § 60; LA. CONST.
art. IV, § 4; MD. CONST. art. III, § 33; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 33; Miss.
CONST. art. IV, § 87; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 53; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 26;
NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20; N.J. CONST. art. IV, §§ 7, 24; N.Y. CONST. art. III,
§ 18; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 10, 11; N.D. CONST. art. II, § 69; ORE. CONST.
art. IV, § 23; PA. CONST. art. III, § 7; S. C. CONST. art. III, § 34; S. D. CONST.
art. III, § 23; TENN. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4, 6, 7, 8; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56;
UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 26; VA. CONST. § 53; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 28;
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39; WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 31; WYo. CONST. art. III,
§ 27.
6. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Mo. CONST. art. IV,
§ 54; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7(9); PA. CONST. art. III, § 8; TEX. CONST. art.
III, § 57.
7. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4:
"The Legislature shall not pass any local or special law on the following
specified subjects:
"(1) For the holding and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the
place of voting.
"(2) Changing the names of persons.
"(3) Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases.
"(4) Authorizing the laying out, opening, closing, altering or maintaining
roads, highways, streets or alleys, or relating to ferries and bridges, or incor-
porating bridge or ferry companies, except for the erection of bridges covering
streams which form boundaries between this and any other State.
"(5) Authorizing the adoption of legitimation of children or the emancipating
of minors.
"(6) Granting divorces.
"(7) Changing the law of descent or succession.
"(8) Affecting the estates of minors or persons under disabilities.
"(9) Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, or refunding moneys legally
paid into the treasury.
"(10) Authorizing the constructing of street passenger railroads in an incor-
porated town or city.
"(11) Regulating labor, trade, manufacturing or agriculture.
"(12) Creating corporations, or amending, renewing, extending or explaining
the charters thereof; provided, this shall not apply to municipal corporations having
a population of not less than twenty-five hundred inhabitants, or to the organiza-
tion of levee districts and parishes, river improvements districts, harbor improve-
ment districts, and navigation districts.
. "(13) Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or
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must be given by publication thirty days prior to the passage of
any special or local act not specifically enumerated in section 4.8
The purpose of this Comment is to examine these constitutional
mandates in the light of the Louisiana jurisprudence.
A statute is special if it operates upon and affects only a
fraction of the persons or a portion of the property encompassed
by such a classification. Such a statute grants privileges to some
and denies them to others, though there is no "natural" distinc-
tion between the two groups. A statute is local if it operates
only in a particular locality without the possibility of extending
its coverage to other areas should the requisite criteria exist
thereY It should be pointed out that the Louisiana jurisprudence
exclusive right, privilege or immunity.
"(14) Extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or for
the relief of any assessor or collector of taxes from the performance of his of-
ficial duties, or of his sureties from liability; nor shall any such law or ordinance
be passed by any political corporation of this State.
"(15) Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of any court, or changing the
rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before the courts, or pro-
viding or changing methods for the collection of debts or the enforcement of
judgments, or prescribing the effects of judicial sales.
"(16) Exempting property from taxation.
"(17) Fixing the rate of interest.
"(18) Concerning any civil or criminal actions.
"(19) Giving effect to infirmal or invalid wills or deeds, or to any illegal dis-
position of property.
"(20) Regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing
of schoolhouses and the raising of money for such purposes, except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution.
"(21) Legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer, servant, or
agent of the State, or of any parish or municipality thereof."
The following corresponding articles are found in earlier Louisiana Constitu-
tions: LA. CONST. art. 48, as amended Acts 1916, No. 115 (1913) corresponds
to LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1921) ; LA. CONST. art. 50 (1913) corresponds to
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. LA. CONST. art. 48 (1898) corresponds to LA. CONST.
art. IV, § 4 (1921) ; LA. CONST. art. 50 (1898) corresponds to LA. CONST. art.
IV, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 46 (1879) corresponds to LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1921) ;
LA. CONST. art. 48 (1879) corresponds to LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1921). All
references in this Comment to the Louisiana Constitution refer to the Constitution
of 1921, unless otherwise indicated.
8. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6: "No local or special law shall be passed . . .
unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published, without
cost to the State, in the locality where the matter or things to be affected may
be situated, which notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law, and
shall be published at least thirty days prior to the introduction into the Legisla-
ture of such bill, and in the same manner provided by law for the advertisement
of judicial sales. The evidence of such notice having been published shall be
exhibited in the Legislature before such act shall be passed, and every such act
shall contain a recital that such notice has been given."
9. "A local or special law is one which, because of its restrictions, can op-
erate upon or affect only a portion of the citizens, a fraction of the property
embraced within the classification created." State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 936,
178 So. 493, 497 (1938).
"The test of whether a law is special or local is whether it operates only on
a certain number of persons, within a class, but does not affect all persons within
that class. . . ." Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com'rs, 209 La. 737, 761,
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does not sufficiently distinguish between special and local legis-
lation; the terms are used interchangeably and the question in
each case is whether an act is special or general with little or
no emphasis on whether it is local.10
A typical case where a statute was held to be invalid as a spe-
cial act is State v. Clement." where the court held that a statute
which prohibited trapping in marsh lands within a certain prox-
imity of the Gulf of Mexico was a local or special law and invalid
for want of publication as required in section 6 of article IV.12
The classification created was marsh lands within 150 miles of
the Gulf. In declaring the act to be special because of the unrea-
sonable classification, the court took notice of the fact that there
were numerous swamp areas without this arbitrary perimeter
and stated that there was no rational justification for the latter's
exclusion. If the statute had been applicable to all marsh lands
in the state, it would have been upheld as a general law.
A general law is one which applies to all persons, places, or
things throughout the state or to all persons, places, or things
brought within the classification created. An act will be con-
sidered general even if the classification is highly restrictive1 3
and even though the conditions under which the statute can op-
erate prevail only in a certain locality, provided there is a rea-
sonable basis for the creation of the classification. 4
The court will look to the inherent nature and purpose of the
statute in determining its validity; the form of the enactment
25 So.2d 527, 534 (1946).
"The words 'local' or 'special' law . . . have been declared in numerous cases
to refer to such laws wherein private individuals are seeking private advantage
or advancement for the benefit of private persons or property within a certain
localtiy." State ex rel. Grosch v. New Orleans, 211 La. 241, 253, 29 So.2d 778,
783 (1947).
"The real distinction between public or general laws is, that the former affect
the community as a whole, whether throughout the State or one of its subdivi-
sions; and the latter affect private persons, private property, private or local
interests." State v. Dalon, 35 La. Ann. 1141, 1144 (1883).
10. The practical effect of such a confusion of the terms is the same as if
they had been distinguished since both are prohibited in the same instance in
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
11. 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938).
12. See note 8 eupra.
13. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2102 (3d ed. 1943).
14. Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage District, 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d
774 (1953) ; State ew rel. Grosch v. New Orleans, 211 La. 241, 29 So.2d 778
(1947); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners for Port of New
Orleans, 209 La. 737, 25 So.2d 527 (1946) ; State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178
So. 493 (1938) ; Benedict v. New Orleans, 115 La. 645, 39 So. 792 (1905) ; State
v. Dolan, 35 La. Ann. 1141 (1883).
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will not serve as a controlling criterion in any case. An act that
is general in form but special in effect - that is, one that grants
special privileges without a reasonable basis therefor - will be
treated as a special act. For example, a statute which provides
that all cities in the state between 500,000 and 501,000 popula-
tion shall be subject to three percent state sales tax annually
would be declared a special law,' 5 because it clearly establishes
an unreasonable classification and is arbitrarily restrictive in
application.
However, general statutes with special provisos or exceptions
have been upheld on the theory that they are basically general
in nature. For example, in Peck v. New Orleans,16 a 1940 stat-
ute1 7 authorized the use of voting machines in sixty-three par-
ishes of the state, but made their use in Orleans Parish manda-
tory. The court, in holding the act general despite its special
mandatory application in Orleans Parish, ignored the inherent
purpose and effect of the statute. The effect of such a decision
is to give judicial cognizance of a device whereby the Legislature
can effectuate special legislation by inserting a special exception
in an otherwise general law.18
At times the Legislature does not resort to such a subterfuge
to conceal its special or local acts. In the recent case of Knapp v.
Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage District,9 the court upheld two
curative acts of the Legislature that ratified the title of the
drainage district to certain property illegally purchased by it
fifteen years previously at a tax sale. The court rejected, in
effect, the argument that the acts were special laws which "legal-
ized the unauthorized or invalid acts" 20 of parish officers, by
holding the acts general2 ' and thus not susceptible to the enu-
15. Actually it is a local law.
16. 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508 (1941).
17. La. Acts 1940, No. 84, p. 406, now LA. R.S. 18:1161-87 (1950).
18. The court has also upheld a statute as general which increased the num-
ber of police jurors in East Baton Rouge Parish, stating that the act was valid
because the jurors held an office created by the Legislature and because the act
provides the election procedure and appointment of police jurors throughout the
state. State v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936).
19. 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d 774 (1953).
20. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21: "The Legislature shall not pass any local or
special law on the following specified subjects:
"Legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer, servant, or agent
of the State, or of any parish or municipality thereof."
21. It should be noted that the acts here were special in form and even con-
tained a statement that the publication requirements of art. IV, § 6, had been
complied with. The court ignored the form, however, holding them to be general
in effect.
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merated prohibitions governing special acts. 22 It seems quite
evident that this was a local law and should have been invalid
as a violation of the prohibition against validating invalid acts
of public officers.23 It is true, as the court pointed out, that all
those within the created class were treated equally, but the classi-
fication created was so limited in scope as to lack reasonable-
ness. It is doubtful whether the segregation of this district from
others in the state was justifiable. This case shows the recent
tendency of the court to uphold a statute as general whenever
possible, so as to avoid the specific prohibitions of section 4 or
the publication requirements of section 6. In comparison with
the Clement case discussed above, it would seem that this statute
provided a much more limited class than marsh lands within 150
miles of the Gulf. The inconsistency of the cases seems apparent,
explainable only by saying that the Knapp case represents an
indication of the court's growing reluctance to apply the consti-
tutional provisions literally.
Perhaps the type of statute most frequently considered by the
court is the population classification statute. Most of these stat-
utes extend only to those areas where the population exceeds a
stated minimum, for example, "all cities over 25,000 population."
Such statutes are usually upheld as general laws because the
courts consider the population differential as a reasonable basis
for the creation of a separate class; it is felt that a difference in
population creates the need for varying types of governmental
services for those within the class that might not be needed by
those excluded. Thus, in order for the court to hold an act valid
as a general law, it follows that the numerical differences in pop-
ulation between cities must reflect an actual basis for differ-
entiation between those cities segregated for special treatment
and those unaffected.2 4 For example, an act was treated as gen-
eral which granted workmen and materialmen certain rights
22. The court concluded that the statutes in question are applicable to all
whose lands were sold to the district at tax sale. .... [The statutes] do not
operate on a certain individual or person within a class but do affect all persons
within that class, that is, those whose property was acquired by the drainage
district at tax sale. It cannot be said that these statutes were enacted for the
benefit of private persons or property within a certain locality ... " 224 La. 115,
116, 68 So.2d 774, 778 (1953).
23. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(21), quoted note 20 aupra.
24. It should be noted that many of the cases involve the question of whether
the population classification is reasonable only incidentally. Often the main issue
is whether the Legislature was justified in providing for amendment of the city's
charter, an act specifically prohibited by LA. CoNST. art. IV, § 4(12), except
where the population of the city exceeds 2,500.
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against the owner in contracts exceeding $1,000, despite the fact
that it was applicable only to cities of 10,000 or more.2 5 An act
which provided for different rates for taxing of amusements in
cities over 25,000 population and those of lesser numbers has
likewise been held general.2 6 The fact that an act is applicable
at present to only one city in the state does not render it a spe-
cial law per se; as long as the criteria for entrance into the class
do not prohibit the entrance of other cities upon their numerical
qualification at a subsequent census, the act will be held gen-
eral.27
Where a statute affects the charter of a particular city of
over 2,500 population, it is a local law. However, it will be up-
held under the jurisprudence, despite the want of prior publica-
tion required by the Constitution for local laws. In State v.
Capdevielle2 the court stated that the publication requirement 29
applied only to "any subject not enumerated in the list of pro-
hibitions of Article 48"30 and that since municipal corporations
having a population of 2,500 or more were specifically enumer-
ated, they are excepted from the publications requirement. The
holding of the Capdevielle case has been affirmed in numerous
subsequent cases.3 1 The net result of this consistent jurispru-
dence is that article IV, section 4, of the Constitution contains
twenty-one instances in which special or local laws are prohibited
and one instance in which they are permitted without prior pub-
lication. When the present Constitution was drafted, the same
language was used in the publication section ;32 therefore, the
court's interpretation of this section was impliedly codified in
the revised Constitution.3 3 Even though this exception to the
25. McKeon v. Sumner Building & Supply Co., 51 La. Ann. 1961, 26 So. 430
(1899).
26. State v. O'Hara, 36 La. Ann. 93 (1884).
27. State v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725
(1938).
28. 104 La. 561, 29 So. 215 (1901).
29. LA. CONST. art. 50 (1898), now LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1921).
30. LA. CONST. art. 48 (1898), now LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1921).
31. State v. Cusimano, 187 La. 269, 174 So. 352 (1937) ; Federal Land Bank
v. John D. Nix, Jr., Enterprises, Inc., 166 La. 566, 117 So. 720 (1928) ; Mul-
haupt v. Shreveport, 126 La. 780, 52 So. 1023 (1910).
32. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
33. Chief Justice O'Niell, who had dissented in the Nix case from the holding
that publication was not necessary, concurred in the later case of State v. Cusi-
mano, 187 La. 269, 174 So. 352 (1937). He stated that the rule of the Capdevielle
case should be adopted. His reason was that the framers of the Constitution of
1921, with full knowledge of this exception created by the jurisprudence, had
chosen to leave the provision unchanged and thus, in effect, had adopted the
court's interpretation as the proper one.
[Vol. XVI
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publication requirement is well settled and no valid argument of
statutory interpretation can be leveled against it, nevertheless,
it is submitted that the result is undesirable as a matter of policy.
It would seem that prior publication of notice of pending stat-
utes which propose to amend city charters is necessary to pre-
vent encroachment on home rule and to prevent the granting of
special privileges without prior notice to the public and to the
Legislature.3 4 It might be observed that, since most population
classification statutes are applicable to a number of areas
throughout the state, they are held to be general laws and the
publication requirements are not at issue.35
In addition to population classification, any other type of
classification will be upheld if it is reasonable, that is, if the
classification is based on a substantial difference between the
class created and the subjects excluded. Sutherland suggests
that a valid classification must include all who "naturally" be-
long within a particular class - "[those] who possess a com-
mon disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be
some natural and substantial differentiation between those in-
cluded in the class and those it leaves untouched."3 6 A "natural
class," it is observed by Sutherland, is but an artificial classifica-
tion which seems logical and valid to both the courts and the
Legislature.
It should be noted that the fact that a court finds an act to be
special (or local) is not necessarily fatal, unless it falls within
one of the specifically prohibited areas enumerated in section 4
of article IV. If not absolutely prohibited, the act is valid pro-
vided the publication requirements of section 6 are complied
with. However, the jurisprudence has recognized certain excep-
tions to these requirements. As stated above, the courts have
written out the notice requirements in regard to acts affecting
charters of cities over 2,500 population. It has also been held
that the notice requirement does not apply to acts enacted at a
special session of the Legislature because of the impracticability
of giving sufficient notice to the public in the interim between
the call for the session and its convening.3 7 A less logical excep-
34. For proposed amendments, see PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA art. IV, §§ 14, 15; art. X, § 1 (1954).
35. Lake Charles v. Roy, 115 La. 939, 40 So. 362 (1906).
36. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2106 (3d ed. 1943).
37. State v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936).
1956]
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tion was formulated in the Nix Enterprises case,88 wherein a
statute, applicable only to cities over 100,060 population (which
included only New Orleans at that time), authorized said munici-
palities to enact certain ordinances relative to the construction
of buildings.3 9 The court found that the statute was, in sub-
stance, a local law but stated that "the act may be regarded as
operating, in effect, as an amendment to the charter of New Or-
leans.140 Since the court had held the statute to be an amend-
ment to the corporate charter of a city [with] over 2,500 popu-
lation, the prior jurisprudence was followed upholding such an
act despite the want of publication. 41
Section 6 of article IV states specifically that there must be
"recital that such [publication] notice has been given" in the
act. It has been held that this recital of compliance with the no-
tice requirement is not rebuttable except in case of fraud.4 2 On
the other hand, if there is no recital that notice has been given,
there is a presumption that there was no notice given.43 It should
be noted that compliance with the notice requirements of section
6 does not, of itself, render an act special that is general in
effect. 44
Among the prohibitions of section 4 that have been most liti-
gated is the one "granting to any corporation, association, or
individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or im-
munity. ' 4 The court will, however, uphold the grant of a spe-
cial or exclusive privilege if it feels the public interest is best
served by doing so. The grant of exclusive franchises for toll
bridges, 46 furnishing a city with gas, 47 and maintaining wharves
38. Federal Land Bank v. John D. Nix, Jr., Enterprises, Inc., 166 La. 566,
117 So. 720 (1928).
39. "[TIhe city council, or other governing body, in municipalities of over
100,000 inhabitants is hereby authorized and empowered, to adopt ordinances . . .
providing for or relating to the construction, equipment, alteration . . . of build-
ings .. " La. Acts 1910, No. 76, p. 122, now LA. R.S. 33:4751' (1950).
40. 166 La. 566, 573, 117 So. 720, 722 (1928).
41. See note 31 ,upra.
42. State v. Murray, 47 La. Ann. 1424, 17 So. 832 (1895).
43. Federal Land Bank v. John D. Nix, Jr., Enterprises, Inc., 166 La. 566
117 So. 720 (1928).
44. Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage District, 224 La. 105, 68 So.2d
774 (1953).
45. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(13) (1921).
46. Talbot v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 159 La. 909, 106 So. 377
(1925) ; Orr v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 159 La. 930, 106 So. 384 (1925) ;
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 159
La. 932, 106 So. 385 (1925).
47. Crescent City Gaslight Co. v. New Orleans Gaslight Co., 27 La. Ann.
138 (1875).
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along the banks of navigable rivers48 have been upheld as reason-
able and in the public interest.
49
Another prohibition that has been subject to exception is the
one prohibiting the passage of a special law "regulating the prac-
tice or jurisdiction of any court .... 50 An act changing the rules
of procedure and evidence in only a certain class of cases has
been held not violative of this provision."'
In referring to the prohibition against special laws "fixing
the rate of interest, 8 52 the court held that the provision does not
apply to the regulation of interest on license taxes imposed by a
city ordinance.5 3 In referring to the provision, the court said,
"We regard [the prohibition] as clearly and exclusively ap-
plicable to contracts between individuals and especially those ap-
pertaining to matters of indebtedness .... ,,54
In regard to the prohibition against the passage of special
or local laws "concerning any civil or criminal action," 55 the
court has held that this section "means merely that the Legisla-
ture shall not pass a local or special law affecting any particular
lawsuit or regulating the trial of lawsuits, civil or criminal, in
any particular locality."8 6
48. New Orleans v. New Orleans, M. & C.R.R., 27 La. Ann. 414 (1875).
49. An act exempting certain classes from the requirements imposed upon
medical practitioners to obtain a certificate from the State Medical Board before
practicing medicine was upheld as reasonable. The exempted classes were farmers
treating their tenants or families, opticians, and persons practicing their religious
convictions. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Charpentier, 140
La. 405, 73 So. 248 (1916) ; Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v.
Vincent, 140 La. 411, 73 So. 250 (1916). See also American Homestead Co. v.
Karstendiek, 111 La. 884, 35 So. 964 (1903), where the court upheld an act
granting special vendor's privileges to homestead associations, stating that any
one meeting the requirements could avail himself of these benefits by organizing
a homestead company and joining this class.
50. "The Legislature shall not pass any local or special law on the following
specified subjects:
"(15) Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of any court, or changing the
rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before the courts, or pro-
viding or changing methods for the collection of debts or the enforcement of
judgments, or prescribing the effects of judicial sales." LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
51. Learned & Koontz v. Texas & P. Ry., 128 La. 430, 54 So. 931 (1911);
court upheld La. Acts 1870, No. 70, now LA. R.S. 45:504 (1950)-which pro-
vided that in suits against railroads for killing or injuring of stock, the owner
need only prove the death or injury to place the burden on the railroad to show
lack of negligence.
52. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(17).
53. New Orleans v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1142, 7 So. 82 (1889).
54. Id. at 114, 7 So. at 83.
55. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(18).
56. State v. McCue, 141 La. 417, 421, 75 So. 100, 101 (1917), where the
court upheld as a general law an act making it unlawful to keep or sell liquor
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It is virtually impossible to state an acceptable rule as to
what criteria the court will use in ascertaining whether an act
is a special (or local) or general law. The following guides
might be helpful, though it is not suggested that they are all-
inclusive. First, determine the scope of the classification created
by the statute; then ascertain whether it is a reasonable classi-
fication; that is, whether there is a prudent basis for segrega-
tion of the particular class for separate treatment. If the classi-
fication is found to be reasonable and if all encompassed by it
are treated equally, then the act is general and valid. If there
is not equal treatment of all embraced by the class created, then
the act is special or local. If the statute provides for unequal
treatment within the class, then reference must be made to the
enumerated instances of article IV, section 4, to ascertain
whether a special or local law in that particular field is pro-
hibited. It should be noted that these specially enumerated
prohibitions merely constitute a constitutional declaration of
whether a particular subject matter is of such a general nature
as to prohibit unequal or special treatment by the Legislature.5 7
If it be found that the special treatment of the subject matter
is not prohibited, then it must be determined whether the pub-
lication requirements have been complied with.58 If the law is
general in application, or special and not of the type specifically
prohibited, then it is valid.
It is significant that the Louisiana State Law Institute, in
its 1954 Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana, saw
fit to retain most of the enumerated prohibitions against special
laws found in section 4 of article IV of the present Constitution.59
However, municipal corporations are not mentioned in the list
of prohibited special acts in the projet; the latter section refers
in "dry" parishes. In State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103 (1917), the court
held that an act prohibiting the keeping of a "blind tiger" (a still) was a gen-
eral law though it was applicable only in the dry parishes and not throughout
the state.
57. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause prohibits classifica-
tion based on unreasonable grounds. Only when the classification is without any
reasonable basis and does not apply alike to all in the same situation are statutes
declared invalid under this clause. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4, is merely the state's
declaration of policy that class legislation in certain enumerated areas is pro-
hibited as a denial of equal protection of the laws because those named areas
are not susceptible of anything but broad general regulation by the Legislature.
The fourteenth amendment is seldom pleaded as a bar to special legislation in
this state, but only because of these state constitutional safeguards.
58. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6, quoted note 8 supra.
59. See PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA art. IV, § 15
(1954).
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only to "private corporations. '60 Municipal corporations are pro-
tected against special legislation by Projet article X, section 1,61
wherein it is provided that the Legislature shall not amend,
modify, or repeal the charter of any municipality by local or
special law 62 unless the municipality continues to operate under
special legislative charter. 63 Under this latter exception, if local
or special laws are passed, notice must be given pursuant to
Projet article IV, section 14.64 The notice or publication section
of the projet repudiates the rule of the jurisprudence that no-
tice is not necessary in regard to special laws amending cor-
porate charters of cities over 2,500 population; under the projet's
publication section, 65 notice is required before the passage of
any special or local law. The reference to "enumerated subjects"
is omitted; this eliminates the loophole developed by the juris-
prudence, 6 and would make a most important change designed
to protect "home rule." As to other changes to the list of limita-
tions on local and special laws, the attitude of the Institute is
well reflected in the statement of its Reporter: "The Institute
considered that the limitations in the present constitution repre-
sented attempts to correct abuses that had actually occurred in
Louisiana and, therefore, considered it wise to retain them.
67
Whether these changes if adopted would deter the courts
from declaring an act general when it is, in effect, local or
special is of course conjectural, but in light of the past juris-
60. "The legislature shall not pass any law or special laws...
"(14) Creating private corporations or amending, renewing, extending, or
explaining the charters thereof." PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOE THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA art. IV, § 15 (14) (1954).
61. "The legislature shall provide for the incorporation and government of the
cities, towns, and villages of the state by general law only, and it shall not amend,
modify, or repeal the charter of any municipality by local or special law, except
that a special legislative charter now in effect may be amended, modified, or re-
pealed by special or local law as long as the municipality continues to operate
under such charter." PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
art. X, § 1 (1954).
62. For an enumeration of the considerations which prompted adoption of the
prohibition, see 3 PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 248
(1954).
63. For a list of the thirty-three municipalities operating under special charters
in 1950, see id. Table X-7, "Louisiana Municipalities, 1954," at 342.
64. Article IV, § 14 states, in part: "No local or special law shall be passed
unless notice of the intention to apply therefor has been published without cost
to the state in the locality where the matter or things to be affected may be sit-
uated. .. ."
65. PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA art. IV, § 14
(1954), quoted in part note 64 supra.
66. See discussion p. 772, supra.
67. 2 PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 392 (1954).
19561
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prudence it seems doubtful. Nevertheless, the adoption of the
changes would at least prevent the Legislature from amending
city charters (not under special legislative charter) without the
consent of the municipality concerned, and that would be a
definite improvement over the present status of the law.
Huntington Odom
Prejudical Remarks of the Trial Judge as Grounds
for Reversal in Louisiana Criminal Cases
The basic law in Louisiana on the province of judge and jury
in criminal cases is set out in article XIX, section 9, of the Louisi-
ana Constitution, which provides:
"... The jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of
the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence,
having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by
the presiding judge."
The constitutional provision is further amplified by article
384 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, which
states:
"It belongs to the jury alone to determine the weight and
credibility of the evidence, but the judge shall have the right
to instruct the jury on the law but not upon the facts of the
.case. The judge shall not state. or recapitulate the evidence,
repeat ' the testimony of any witness, nor give any opinion as
to what facts have been proved or refuted."
These provisions make clear that, as a rule, issues of fact are
within the exclusive province of the jury, while issues of law are
to be decided by the judge. However, not every issue of fact in a
criminal case is decided by the jury. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has indicated that questions of fact are to be decided by
the jury only when they have a direct bearing upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and that procedural issues of fact are
to be decided by the judge. For example, although the question
of venue is one of fact, it is a procedural matter for the judge to
decide.'
1. State v. Paternostro, 224 La. 87, 68 So.2d 767 (1953).
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